According to modern ecological theory, ecosystems are fragile combinations of diverse elements, and their resilience-or ability to recover after external shocks-varies as the system develops. Under conditions of low resilience, the system can collapse unpredictably and shift into a new state. Biodiversity in ecosystems, however, helps to maintain resilience. These basic natural principles also help to illuminate the social processes of empires. Like ecosystems, empires expand, grow, and collapse unpredictably when they lose the ability to respond to external shocks. Just as biodiversity increases resilience, imperial formations prosper when they are more cosmopolitan, incorporating diverse cultural elements that foster institutional innovation, and they suffer collapse when they limit participation by outside challengers. The author develops this analogy between ecosystems and imperial formations through a discussion of the Ming and Qing empires, concluding with reflections on the Maoist production system and the current resilience of China today.
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Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8) This article uses concepts from modern ecology to understand China's historical and contemporary challenges in addressing environmental degradation and sustainability. I first outline a model of the adaptive cycle as applied to both small ecosystems and larger scales of human societies and then give a few examples of how we may frame our understanding of China's environmental history using this model. This biological model stresses the importance of species and environmental diversity for sustainability and resilience. After introducing this model, I discuss the concepts of cosmopolitanism and diversity in the human cultural sense, to see if we can link these concepts to changes in material forms of Chinese states and economies in modern times. Thus, this article is about the ecology of empire in both natural and human senses. Many observers have noticed the similarity between the territory of the People's Republic of China (PRC), excluding Mongolia and Taiwan, and that of the Qing at its maximal degree of expansion. Moreover, modern-day China more nearly approximates the size of the empire from which it descends than any other nation-state left in the world. All other empires have broken up into many pieces. And China has long been a vast space composed of many regions, each with distinctive climatic, geographic, and cultural characteristics. These regions have persisted for centuries, despite a tumultuous history of imperial collapse and revolutionary upheaval.
Some perspectives from modern ecological theory and environmental history can help us understand both China's diversity and its repeated experiences of collapse and renewal. In short, periods of expansion in China's imperial history generally corresponded to times of increased diversity of peoples and openness toward multiple perspectives, among both the elites and the masses. These periods were followed by briefer times of contraction and inwardness, during which hostility toward the outside world increased and internal dissent was repressed. These processes of expansion and contraction often proceeded in parallel with changing cultural horizons of openness and exclusion. Perdue 7 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8)
The Adaptive Cycle
The adaptive cycle model was originally developed by the ecologist C. S. Holling and others in the 1970s to explain how ecosystems cycle between different stable states as they undergo sharp transitions between states.
2 The r phase, called "exploitation," describes a period when there is rapid dispersal and rapid growth of species competing with one another in an open area (like a meadow). This is followed by the K phase of "conservation," a time of slower growth and protection of gains (for example, a climax forest). We can extend the model to embrace human economies as well as biological ecosystems. For an economic theorist, the r phase describes the activities of entrepreneurs, while the K phase describes bureaucratic consolidation.
But as consolidation-whether natural or organizational-proceeds, the system becomes increasingly less resilient-that is, more vulnerable to external shocks. When a disaster strikesin the form of a forest fire, drought, or insect pests, or financial crises, or rebellion-the system shifts to the "release," or omega (Ω) phase. The economist Joseph Schumpeter called this a process of "creative destruction"; China historians might call it dynastic collapse.
After this collapse, there is a phase of "reorganization"-the alpha (A) phase-in which materials released by the collapse, like nutrients, are put back together to begin a new phase of growth. Pioneer species reseed a burned area; new plants grow in lakes and woodlands; and grasslands recover their vegetation. Then a new phase of growth begins, with a somewhat different combination of elements or a repetition of the previous process.
The adaptive cycle resembles the traditional Chinese theory of the dynastic cycle. The two models share a focus on growth, loss of resilience, collapse, and reorganization under a new dynastic or biological regime. Like the dynastic cycle theory, the adaptive cycle model leaves open the question of whether the reorganization phase will lead simply to restoration of the previous system, or to the creation of a new ecosystem that operates on a larger scale, or with different elements, or with a different dynamic. It's an intriguing parallel, but the adaptive cycle is rooted in natural science and not morality. The adaptive cycle model also shares some similarities with the Marxist idea that contradictions drive social and natural change, but it does not necessarily imply that the outcome of these contradictions is a higher stage of society. These three models share a general perspective that systems operate under conditions of dynamic Perdue 8 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8) instability that are barely kept under control by natural or political forces. These models contrast with those of classical ecology and neoclassical economics, both of which were rooted in theories of static equilibrium derived from thermodynamics of the late nineteenth century.
The first application of the adaptive cycle model, by C. S. Holling, looked at the relationship between spruce fir forests in eastern North America, an insect called the spruce budworm, and the birds that controlled the insects (Holling 1973; Gunderson and Holling 2002 ).
There were two stable states: one with low budworm populations and young, growing trees and another with high budworm populations, mature trees, and extreme defoliation. Periodically, every 40 to 130 years, up to 80 percent of the spruce fir trees would die from budworm attacks in a natural cycle. The reason for the sudden flip from one state to another was the change in effectiveness of birds in keeping the budworm population down. As the foliage grew thicker on the maturing trees, the birds could not find the budworms as easily, so the budworm population would suddenly explode, thus damaging the trees and resetting the system. The famous biologist Rachel Carson, whose writings founded the modern American environmental movement, noted the disastrous consequences of massively destructive spraying of DDT to rid forests of the budworm in her now-classic book, Silent Spring (Carson 1962, 130-137) .
The case of the spruce fir forests, a simple model with only three actors, has had large implications. First, it showed that, contrary to earlier predictions by ecologists and economists, ecosystems do not naturally achieve equilibrium. Instead, they cycle unpredictably among different states, and the transitions between those states are sharp and catastrophic. The adaptive model has been confirmed for many other ecosystem processes, including eutrophication of lakes, growth of coral reefs, and the relationship in arid regions among grazing animals, grasslands, and woody shrubs (Gunderson and Holling 2002, 30-39) . The model is not only a description of nature; it also has implications for how human societies can manage a natural system and how they should intervene in it. It strongly questions the idea that one can achieve a permanent stable state. Repeated, sporadic waves of "release," or "creative destruction," or "permanent revolution" seem to be embedded in nature. Gunderson and Holling (2002, 41) .
A time of apparent expansion-of a forest, an empire, or an economy-can mask a period of reduced resilience, which in turn increases the threat of a catastrophic outcome.
Gunderson and Holling distinguish between "engineering resilience" and "ecological resilience" (Gunderson and Holling 2002) . Engineering resilience aims at achieving a fixed target, such as maximizing sustainable yield of a fishery-or, to use a Chinese example, maximizing grain output-while ignoring the effect that maximizing a single variable has on the entire system. Ecological resilience takes into account the interaction among multiple factors, not just a single one. The goal of sustainability is not simply to reach a fixed target but to remove the underlying factors that cause the adaptive cycle to have such severe results. 
Managing the Yellow River
The management of the Yellow River provides an excellent analogue to the adaptive cycle and suggests how we might apply this model to a system that includes human intervention.
The Yellow River carries a high load of silt, which is picked up from the loess soils of northwest China after heavy rainfall in a deforested region. As the rate of flow slows down in the North China Plain, the silt builds up. In a natural river, the silt would cause the river to meander across the flat plain. But beginning around the second century B.C.E., the humans who settled the North China Plain built large dikes around the river, for military purposes. Trapped by the dikes, the silt settled down in one place, causing the riverbed to rise. In response, Chinese settlers invested much effort in building the dikes even higher, and thus the system moved toward greater inputs of capital and labor (the K phase) in order to maintain the river's flow. But the dikes would eventually break, causing catastrophic releases. The river would flood the plain, drowning and uprooting millions of peasant farmers. The riverbed would then shift, sometimes north or south of the Shandong Peninsula. "Reorganization" in this cycle meant mass migrations of farmers, destruction of farmland and villages, and great human suffering. Eventually, settlement would resume, and the cycle would begin all over again. This process, including human actors, closely resembles the abstract model of the adaptive cycle. As population density increased in North China over many centuries, the incidence of flooding grew more severe, but the essential dynamics of the cycle did not change for over a millennium (Elvin 1993, 30-33; Mostern 2013 ).
But we have to add another element: sometimes the release phase was deliberately triggered by humans for political purposes. Several times in imperial history Chinese officials deliberately broke the dikes for strategic reasons. Song rulers did this in the eleventh century C.E. to stop the Liao invasions; Ming rulers did it in the sixteenth century to protect imperial ancestral tombs and grain transport; and Chiang Kai-shek notoriously broke the dikes in the twentieth century to stop the Japanese invasion of North China (Zhang 2009; Ma 2010; Muscolino 2010 ).
In each case, this hydraulic warfare failed at immense human cost. These examples reveal one factor that differentiates human systems from natural ones: the ability of political elites to make ecological choices that have large consequences. In these cases, some of the consequences (causing the flood) were intended, but others (stopping the enemy) failed. In ecologists' terms, Perdue 11 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8) potential leaks away, and the system flips into a less productive and less organized form as a result of the intervention of elites concerned more with state power than with human welfare.
Diversity and Sustainability in Ecosystems and Empires
The Yellow River example shows that ecosystems and empires are closely linked.
Ecosystems and empires also share features of diversity that affect their ability to endure for long periods of time. As Gunderson and Holling concisely put it, "biodiversity contributes resilience to the functioning of an ecosystem" (2002, 406) . The phases of highest external influence and greatest internal diversity correspond to the early periods of reorganization and expansion. For ecologists, these phases include the maximum potential for biological creativity, through the introduction of new species and new ecosystem functions. To understand the durability of empires and nations, we likewise need to consider cosmopolitanism and diversity.
Cosmopolitanism implies openness to influences from abroad and willingness to respect differences. Diversity means promoting internal differentiation through policies of decentralization, indirect rule, and cultural pluralism. Empires are large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people. The nation-state, in contrast, is based on the idea of a single people in a single territory constituting itself as a unique political community. . . The nation-state tends to homogenize those inside its borders and exclude those who do not belong, while the empire reaches outward and draws, usually coercively, peoples whose difference is made explicit under its rule. The concept of empire presumes that different peoples within the polity will be governed differently. (2010, 8) The historical sociologist Charles Tilly likewise argues:
An empire is a large composite polity linked to a central power by indirect rule. The central power exercises some military and fiscal control in each major segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates the two major elements of indirect rule: 1) retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts for the Empires, of course, have been extremely long-lasting political structures, far more enduring than nation-states so far. As Burbank and Cooper write:
Empire was a remarkably durable form of state. . . . By comparison, the nationstate appears as a blip on the historical horizon . . . whose hold on the world's political imagination may well prove partial or transitory. (2010, (2) (3) This imperial combination of diversity and endurance suggests that, following the ecological perspective, we may draw an analogy between the role of biodiversity in sustaining resilient ecosystems and the contrasting effects of difference and homogeneity on the long-term survival of empires and nation-states. Perdue 13 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8)
Chinese Examples of Imperial and Ecological Dynamics
Such broad contrasts between the heterogeneous compositions of most empires and the tendencies toward homogenization and standardization generally seen in nation-states are plausible, but they neglect dynamics within imperial formations that can shift an empire's orientation away from openness and diversity toward less expansive and more narrowly defined identities. But in the later phases of imperial development, after expansion ceases, there is often a tendency toward inwardness, rigidity, and lack of creativity, and the empire often ends with a major disaster, produced by ignorance, lack of resources, and blinkered political discourse. These phenomena of narrowness and fragility correspond to the culmination of the K phase of the adaptive cycle. The early Ming dynasty is a good example, and the story of Ming policy toward its borders reveals this polarity between openness and closure.
Ming Expansion, Consolidation, and Decline
The Ming dynasty, after throwing off Mongol rule in the first half of the fifteenth century, expanded rapidly in all directions-both continental and maritime. The Yongle Emperor He also launched the Zheng He expeditions, each of which carried over 25,000 troops and 250 ships; these expeditions were intended to awe the peoples of the southern seas with Chinese military might, collect important trade goods and intelligence information, and intervene in local politics. Zheng He's naval officers also collected exotic species, such as giraffes from Africa, for presentation to the Ming court. They expanded the geographic and biological knowledge of the Chinese elites.
During this period, the Ming orientation to the world was cosmopolitan. It inherited the aspiration for universal empire from the Yuan dynasty, and it incorporated foreign people into its social structure. Zheng He himself was a Muslim, and his sailors had intimate familiarity with the many seafarers of the southern seas. Yongle incorporated surrendered Mongols into his armies, and he enjoyed vigorous campaigning in the steppe. Yongle built the great capital city of Beijing as the Ming's second capital, balancing the orientation of the dynasty between the distinct regions of north and south.
Shortly after Yongle's death, the next emperor and his officials cancelled the Zheng He voyages, shut down coastal trade, and turned their attention to the Mongol threat in the northwest. In 1449, however, a later emperor suffered an embarrassing reversal when he led an ill-advised expedition into the steppes of Mongolia and was captured by the Mongol Khan. This could have meant the end of the dynasty, but the elites back in Beijing quickly reorganized the government and put the emperor's brother on the throne, subjecting the hapless emperor to virtual house arrest once he returned. After the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming became much more inward oriented and defensive toward the northwest, while it also tried to shut down trade along the southern coast. The result was a loss of resilience and diversity: "pirates" flourished in the form of illegal traders, while nomads who were refused trading relations launched raids to get what they wanted.
Once again the Ming imperial system faced crisis, but in the sixteenth century it reorganized itself for a second time. The wokou ("dwarf pirate") crisis of the midsixteenth century, which coincided with increasingly large raids by Mongols in the northwest,
shows how a regime threatened with near-complete loss of control on its periphery can creatively The Great Wall of the Ming dynasty . . . was naturally much stronger than the Great Wall of the Qin and Han dynasties. And yet it too exhausted the strength of the Ming and greatly hurt its vitality. . . . The majestic section of the Great Wall at Gubeikou pass was built by the famous general Qi Jiguang [who rebuilt the wall in the north, and also built a Great Wall along the coast to defend against the Japanese pirates]. . . . Qi Jiguang was the most talented military strategist of the Ming dynasty, but he has also left us with a great regret: why was it that the pirates of an island country could cross the seas to attack China, [and] the Europe of that time possessed an armed navy that pursued conquest in all directions, while China could think only of rebuilding the Great Wall? . . . In 1588 Qi Jiguang died amid poverty and illness, [but] at this very time, the invincible Spanish Armada was about to set out to conquer England and to open up a tumultuous new page in the history of the early modern world. (Bodman, Su, and Wang 1991, 127-129) 
Cosmopolitanism and Cooperation in the High Qing and After
The most famous phase of cosmopolitanism, marked by the arrival of the Jesuits, texts that hinted at anti-Manchu sentiment (Guy 1987) . In the strange "soulstealers" sorcery scare of 1768, the Qianlong Emperor tried to track down an elusive group of wandering rebels who, he claimed, were cutting off the queues of Chinese people to promote an anti-Manchu rebellion.
Despite the best efforts of his bureaucrats and a culture of fear and denunciation generated by this initiative, he never found any genuine queue-cutting rebels (Kuhn 1990 ). The evernormal granary system (changpingcang ), which stored grain in all the counties of China to provide famine relief and price stabilization, expanded to an unmanageable size by the late eighteenth century, and much of the grain rotted from misuse or was diverted to other purposes (Will and Wong 1991) . The frontier expansion of Han Chinese aroused great resentment both from native peoples who were displaced by the new settlers and from other Han migrants who fought with new migrants for land. A series of frontier rebellions broke out in the late eighteenth century, heralding the end of the flourishing age. In the eighteenth century, we find fascinating polarities between creativity and dogmatism, optimism and paranoia, and expansion and defensiveness, which characterize phases of growth and consolidation.
Many historians have argued that the "flourishing age" of the high Qing demonstrates a dynamism embedded in the classical system that could produce great achievements in economic growth, social mobility, and literary and scholarly production, along with military conquest. But we still have not been able to explain adequately why the glories of the flourishing age turned into the humiliating experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Perhaps the resilience concept will help illuminate the sudden transformation of the high Qing into the beleaguered "sick man of Asia" of the nineteenth century. Robert Marks concludes that "the Chinese empire had reached its ecological limits . . . and was becoming deforested and experiencing the effects of ecological degradation" by 1800 (Marks 2012 ). Although we cannot estimate precisely the "resilience" of the Qing imperial system at the end of the eighteenth century, it is clear that beneath the surface of impressive economic growth, advances in scholarship, and mobilization of resources for social welfare was a more fragile equilibrium, losing its ability to resist the impact of environmental and external forces. Perdue 19 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8)
Nineteenth-Century Crisis and Creativity
During the nineteenth century, the consequences of Qing China's declining resilience revealed themselves in a series of catastrophes, including losses to foreign powers, internal rebellions, administrative decay, and natural disasters. Yet even in this century of humiliation, the onset of China's "omega" phase, we can find intriguing examples of interpersonal and international cooperation aimed at relieving the empire's difficulties. One of these examples is related to coastal trade and central finance, the other to the drought-stricken interior and private philanthropy.
These institutional innovations demonstrate continued creativity as well as the limits to possible change within the imperial system. From the traditional Chinese point of view, they indicated the chances for dynastic revival (zhongxing ). From our ecological perspective, they added some resiliency to the system without fundamentally challenging its structure. Both kinds of reforms arose from crises on the borders, closely connected to challenges of reforming the state in the new imperial world of the late nineteenth century. (1953) , the Harvard historian of modern China John K. Fairbank described a process of intercultural negotiation that took place after the conclusion of the first Opium War. As a result of the treaties signed in Nanjing in 1842, the first of China's unequal treaties, China opened its treaty ports and allowed British consuls to be stationed in the ports and fixed tariffs to be levied on imported goods. Both the British and the Chinese had great difficulty controlling trade along the coast, because many of the goods, such as opium, were illegal and because the traders were unsupervised boat people who wanted to evade customs duties. But the two nations had a joint interest in making the treaty system work. The British wanted to promote the legal trade, as well as the opium trade, while
In his classic first book, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast
Chinese authorities wanted to collect customs duties as best they could. For a while, Qiying, the Manchu negotiator for the Qing, and Henry Pottinger, the British representative, were able to work together for common interests. Qiying's approach was to stick to the limits of the treaty system while establishing close personal relations with Pottinger, in the classical spirit of "cherishing visitors from afar" (huairou yuanren ). He asked for a picture of Pottinger's wife and even offered to adopt his son. My second example-a more material one-illustrates an adaptive cycle that did go through a catastrophic boom and crash, one that was exacerbated rather than minimized by state action. The "incredible famine" (qihuang ) of 1876 to 1879 was the result of a three-year drought in North China, which led to the deaths of nine to thirteen million Chinese farmers in the five northern provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong. The famine itself was the culmination of a long period of decline that had struck this poor northern region since the eighteenth century. Shanxi was once a fairly prosperous region, with trade routes extending into Central Asia and famous bankers who financed commercial enterprise all over the empire. But the shift of trade routes to the coast damaged the areas dependent on inner-Asian trade, and the loss of strategic interest in the region after the completion of the eighteenth-century conquests meant that Shanxi and much of interior North China suffered from poor roads, underfinanced local administration, and low grain reserves to protect against drought. Its resilience had been severely undermined.
Just before the drought, in 1874, the leading officials of the self-strengthening movement,
Li Hongzhang (1823 Hongzhang ( -1901 and Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885), had debated the relative importance of allocating military and economic resources between the coast and the interior (Hsü 1964 (Hsü -1965 . Li Hongzhang wanted to build up the Chinese fleets to face the rising threat of Japan, while Zuo Zongtang insisted on maintaining a large army to guard against expansion by Russia.
In this debate, the two primary advocates of strengthening China's economic and military resources clashed with each other, but neither of them focused on North China itself. Zuo
Zongtang won a great deal out of this debate, and he was able to use his powerful army to drive out the Russians from the Ili valley in Xinjiang in 1878. Li Hongzhang received part of the money he had requested for his fleet as well. But when the drought struck, officials and missionaries trying to deliver grain supplies to the regions found that the roads were so poor, they could not get the grain there quickly enough. The self-strengtheners had completely neglected to repair the road system of North China, because their primary goals were military and economic defense. The ecological priorities of the Qing state had shifted: no longer was its primary goal the preservation of the independent Chinese farmer; instead, armies, navies, and modern industry took precedence (Perdue 2005 ).
Perdue 22 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8) But the famine also called forth a tremendous outburst of popular mobilization for relief by both Chinese and foreigners (Edgerton-Tarpley 2008) . In the lower Yangzi, prosperous gentry families donated relief funds, in money or in grain, and published small pamphlets depicting starving peasants, which they used to pull at people's philanthropic heartstrings. James Legge, the well-known translator of Chinese classics, also translated these illustrated pamphlets into English to help with fundraising in England and the United States (Committee of the China Famine Relief Fund 1878; "Tears from Iron"). Figure 5 , a copy of one particularly graphic page from these pamphlets, depicts corpses abandoned on the roads being eaten by birds, and on the right indicates actual cannibalism. The money tree shown at the end of the pamphlet suggests all of the blessings the donor will receive in the next life if he gives money for relief (figure 6). The International Famine Relief Committee was one of the first international relief organizations (the ancestor of Live Aid concerts), and along with the Chinese gentry, these organizations occupied the role that the Chinese state could only partially fill. The participation in relief campaigns of gentry in cooperation with foreign donors represents a creative adaptation and merging of Confucian, Buddhist, and Christian cultures of charity in response to crisis. In sum, during the nineteenth century, the Qing social system continued to create adaptive responses to a series of severe challenges, giving the dynasty a surprisingly long duration in the face of nearly overwhelming difficulties.
Famine and the Adaptive Cycle in Twentieth-Century China
My final example of the insights provided by the adaptive cycle model comes from the twentieth century, focusing on the Great Leap Forward and the famine that ensued, from 1958 to 1961 (Harrell 2007) . From today's vantage point, the Great Leap looks like a paradoxical combination of extreme modern rationalism and wild superstition. While party leaders aimed at rapid economic development based on the key technological achievements of the Soviet and Western model-coal and iron-peasants melted down their cooking pots to make backyard steel and destroyed the agricultural system in pursuit of impossibly high yields. In the political scientist James Scott's terms, it was a consequence of "high modernism" gone wild (Scott 1998 ). Ecologists call it the primary error of "first stream science"-that is, bad engineering that ignores the interdependent properties of ecosystems (Gunderson and Holling 2002) . The Great Leap tried to maximize short-term output of only two variables-grain and steel-while ignoring the relationship between these products and the rest of the system. The adaptive cycle struck back with a vengeance: nature was not impressed by communes, Mao Zedong and the Communist Party thought. Instead-as in the 1870s, but on a larger scale-famine struck large parts of China, with a death toll of at least thirty million people. We still do not understand the exact scope of the disaster, but in a recent book entitled Tombstone (Mubei ), the Chinese scholar Yang Jisheng has documented a great deal of the suffering, using archival sources. The German historian Felix Wemheuer, relying on oral histories and local archives, has reconstructed the famine's course through some of the most severely struck regions, and he has published a book comparing the Chinese famine to that of the Soviet Union in the 1930s (Wemheuer 2007 (Wemheuer , 2012  see also Yang 2012).
These studies provide a great deal of evidence that basic ecological principles were violated. Farmers increased the areas for cultivating grain by "deep plowing"-or turning over the soil two to three feet deep-a practice that created "mounds of poisoned earth" by destroying soil nutrients, and by investing in hasty and shoddy irrigation works with large amounts of mass labor (Yang 2012). Moreover, the emphasis on growing grain meant reducing the output of fish, vegetables, and other crops deemed "nonessential." Likewise, efforts to make backyard steel involved melting down local supplies of pots and pans and deforesting the countryside to create useless lumps of metal. The resulting famine represents a catastrophic "omega" phase of the agrarian cycle, and it was primarily caused by state action: the misallocation of human resources for misguided activity and the excessive extraction of grain to feed the urban population.
We may also note the rigidity imposed by nationalist ideology on state policies. Even when Mao and the ruling elite became aware of the severity of the famine, they refused to cancel grain exports sent to the Soviet Union to pay for China's industrial imports, because they believed doing so would be too humiliating, revealing China's failure to progress fast enough Some optimistic analysts extrapolate from this period to predict that China will soon overtake the United States in GDP level. But one thing the adaptive cycle shows is that linear extrapolations are unlikely to happen. Rapid growth also brings with it internal strains and Perdue 26 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8) concealed loss of resilience that eventually undermine the original sources of growth. So we should ask whether China is becoming more or less resilient over time, and whether it is generating enough intellectual resources, including cosmopolitan creativity, to handle its future challenges. So far, the response of the top leadership, and many prominent intellectuals, has been disappointingly unimaginative. Three brief comments will illustrate the limits on creative thinking in contemporary China.
First, the political system is closed. Despite the call of former Premier Wen Jiabao for political reform, echoing that of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in earlier times, the party as a whole seems devoted primarily to preserving its power position, not to responding to popular pressure. We have just seen the meteoric rise and fall of Bo Xilai, a man who enthusiastically promoted the collective singing of Mao songs. Invocation of totalitarian nostalgia for the 1950s combined with nationalist victim narratives is the party's last resort for gaining credibility.
Second, environmental pressures are increasing. There has been a constant lack of water for North China, and the response to this decades-long drought has been not to push water conservation, but to create even larger engineering projects, like the great transfer of water from south to north (Nanshui Beidiao ). This is a broad technological solution aimed at keeping the existing system in place, with dense populations and high levels of water usage in cities and farms, still based on policies of developmental modernism reminiscent of the 1960s.
Third, China is much more dependent on the outside world for resources and markets than ever before. It can develop only in an open trading order, where it is free to export its products based on cheap labor and to buy the energy resources it needs for industrial growth. The also advocated enacting taxes and other measures to lower China's carbon emissions, and he has openly declared that China must sacrifice some of its rapid GDP growth rate in order to address deep environmental crises. Mao Yushi represents a more cosmopolitan, international perspective than his critics, who invoke Mao Zedong as their model, but the controversy over these two approaches to sustainability and economic growth has become quite heated in recent years.
On the one hand, if the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution represent the periods of China's maximal isolation from the world, and if, as former Premier Wen Jiabao has said, the "pernicious influence" of the Cultural Revolution still survives in China today, then China is still threatened by a rising tide of totalitarian nostalgia evoking a utopian image of the socialist years. On the other hand, intellectuals from the international tradition of free thought reaching back to the late Qing dynasty still advocate studying "problems not isms" (Mao Yushi, echoing Hu Shi) , and empirical approaches to pressing issues of environmental preservation, social justice, and political freedom. In the past, China has developed the most when it creatively adopted elements of cultural traditions originating outside the Han core, including Central Asian Holling's model is one of a number of efforts to theorize the operation of complex adaptive systems. For a general discussion of the biosphere as such a system, see Levin (1999) . 3 For a recent study of the maritime Customs in the twentieth century, see Brunero (2006) .
